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Abstract
In this study we assume that household demand for private and public
goods are the e¢cient outcomes of the household decission process. From
the e¢cient assumption we derive testable properties of these demands and
we identify some characteristics of the intrahousehold distribution of the
household expenditure. These results extend Chiappori (1988) main results
to the case of joint consumption of private and public goods.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Although people within the household exchange material and immaterial goods,
we can only observe the material aggregate consumption that results from this
exchange process. The di¢culty, of course, is that aggregate household consump-
tion equals individual consumption in only three cases: single-person households,
public goods, and in the case of goods whose consumption is exclusive to a house-
hold member (exclusive goods).
Traditional models of household demand based on a representative consumer
are called unitary models. Because empirical properties derived from them (ag-
gregation, homogeneity, symmetry and negative semi-de…niteness of the Slutsky
matrix) have received little empirical support, we may conclude that individ-
ual rationality presents serious di¢culties when attempting to explain household
behavior.
Alternatively, household behavior can be modeled as a decision process in
which several individuals are involved. These kinds of models, known as collec-
tive models, have two principal objectives. i) to derive empirical properties of
household demand, and ii) to recover the intrahousehold allocations of goods and
welfare.
Within collective models, there is a strand of the literature that is based
on the idea that “the household is modeled as a two-member collectivity taking
Pareto-e¢cient decisions” (Chiappori, 1988). According to the assumptions of
the model, we distinguish between three groups of papers which, in chronological
order, are:
1) Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981) model house-
hold decisions as the equilibrium from a Nash bargaining game where the threat
point is a function of exogenous variables called extrahousehold environmental
parameters (EEP). The Nash bargaining game results in e¢cient outcomes, so
these models …t into Chiappori’s e¢ciency idea.
2) Chiappori (1988, 1992) provides the most general framework for the study
of the intrahousehold allocation of private goods under the sole assumption of
e¢ciency. Within this framework, there are two types of important results: those
involving empirical properties of labor supply functions for egoistic agents, and
those referring to the recovery of the sharing rule between household members.
3) The third group of models also starts from the e¢ciency premise but adds
the assumption of the existence of, at least, a distribution factor that a¤ects the
reserve utility of both agents but does not a¤ect either their preferences for goods
or the budget constraint. A distribution factor is, therefore, an EEP in McEl-
roy’s terminology. This methodology is applied, for example, in Bourguignon et
al. (1993, 1995), Browning and Chiappori (1994), Browning et al. (1994), and
Chiappori et al. (1997).
The aim of this paper is to derive empirical properties of the household de-
mands, and to recover intrahousehold allocations in the presence of public goods.
For this purpose, we extend Chiappori’s (1988) parametric model allowing for the
joint choice between public and private goods. The assumption of weak separa-
bility between private and public goods, implicit in Chiappori’s model, does not
lead to any new result. But under a di¤erent separability assumption between
public goods and exclusive goods, we obtain the following results:
1) E¢ciency necessary conditions on household demands for private and public
goods. We prove that the conditions obtained in Chiappori (1988) are a particular
case of ours when the consumption of public goods is zero.
2) We do not recover the intrahousehold allocation of private goods completely,
but we do recover its variation with respect to prices. The corresponding results
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in Chiappori’s model without public goods are nested into ours.
The theoretical importance of the assumption S is based on the possibility of
measuring the e¤ect of the public goods on the sharing rule. Also, the empirical
restrictions allows the new e¤ect of the public goods. The main limitation of the
assumption S is the applicability of the model to labor supply. Since the wages
could a¤ect the public good demands, our assumption is not applicable to this
case. If we consider clothing for the man and the woman as the exclusive goods
and the clean house as the public good, we can test the assumption S.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we introduce the notation
and Chiappori’s main results under weak separable preferences between private
and public goods. In section 3 we introduce a di¤erent separability assumption
and derive our results. In section 4 we apply the above results for a particular
speci…cation of household demands. In section 5 we discuss the main restrictions
and contributions of our model to the empirical study of consumer behavior.
2. THE INITIAL MODEL: NOTATION AND CHIAPPORI’S RE-
SULTS
Assume that a household consists of two adults who decide on how to allocate
the household endowment, X; among goods, which we classify into three groups.
First, there are private goods like food, alcohol, tobacco, and goods linked to
education or entertainment activities for which individual consumptions are un-
observable. What we observe is the aggregate consumption of private goods
Z = Z1 + Z2; where Zi is the amount consumed by agent i for i = 1; 2: Second,
we observe individual expenditures for some adult exclusive goods, like women’s
or men’s clothing expenditures. Leisure is a special case of an exclusive good
included in Chiappori (1988) but which is excluded from our model. We denote
by qi the exclusive good consumed by agent i: Finally, household public goods
(Q) are goods that are characterized by non-rivalry and non-exclusion, for which
individual consumption coincides with the aggregate amount. Expenditures on
housing and furniture and their maintenance are household public goods, which
we call “clean house” following Pollak and Wachter (1975).
Household preferences are characterized by a pair of utility functions, U i
¡
qi; Zi;Q
¢
for i = 1; 2; which are assumed to be strictly monotonic, strongly quasi-concave,
and twice continuously di¤erentiable.
To sum up, the household is an economy, »; characterized by two consumption
sets,
©
qi; Z i;Q
ª ½ R3+, two utility functions U i : ©qi; Zi;Qª ! R; i = 1; 2; and
the income household endowment, X:
3
2.1. Chiappori’s (1988) Results: A Reinterpretation
Chiappori’s original model studies the following question: what conditions char-
acterize the leisure
¡
Li
¢
and private goods (Z) demands if they arise from an
e¢cient allocation? The demand functions with this property are called collec-
tively rational for egoistic agents.
De…nition 1. Let T be the time endowment for both agents. For any wages,
w1; w2; and non-labor income, y; the household demand for leisure (L
1
(w1; w2; y) ; L
2
(w1; w2; y))
is said to be collectively rational for egoistic agents (CREA) if there exist
two demand functions Z
1
and Z
2
from R3+ to R+; and two utility functions
U1
¡
L1; Z1
¢
and U2
¡
L2; Z2
¢
such that the functions L1; L2; Z1; Z2 solve the fol-
lowing problem:
Max
L1;L2;Z1;Z2
U1
¡
L1; Z1
¢
+ ¹ (w1; w2; y) U
2
¡
L2; Z2
¢
s:t: Z1 + Z2 · y + w1 ¡T ¡ L1¢ + w2 ¡T ¡ L2¢
The …rst order conditions for this problem are:
U1q1
¡
L1; Z1
¢
= w1U
1
z1
¡
L1; Z1
¢
; 1 (2.1)
U2q2
¡
L2; Z2
¢
= w2U
2
z2
¡
L2; Z2
¢
; 2 (2.2)
Z1 + Z2 = y + w1
¡
T ¡ L1¢ + w2 ¡T ¡ L2¢ :3 (2.3)
One of the main reasons why adults decide to live together is to enjoy scale
economies in the consumption of public goods. From this perspective, the above
model can be reinterpreted as a model under the assumption of weakly separable
preferences between private and exclusive goods, on the one hand, and public
goods, on the other. If we let C be the price of a single public good and replace
labor supply
¡
T ¡ Li¢ by ¡qi; wages wi by prices pi; and non-labor income y by
private and exclusive goods expenditures x = X¡CQ; then the problem becomes:
Max
q1;q2;Z1;Z2;Q
U1
¡
v11
¡
q1; Z1
¢
; v12 (Q)
¢
+ ¹U2
¡
v21
¡
q2; Z2
¢
; v21 (Q)
¢
(P2)
s:t: p1q
1 + p2q
2 + Z1+ Z2 + CQ · X:
The …rst order conditions for this new problem are:
v1q1
¡
q1; Z1
¢
= p1v
1
z1
¡
q1; Z1
¢
; 4 (2.4)
v2q2
¡
q2; Z2
¢
= p2v
2
z2
¡
q2; Z2
¢
; 5 (2.5)
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U12
¡
v11
¡
q1; Z1
¢
; v12 (Q)
¢
v12Q (Q)
U11
¡
v11 (q
1; Z1) ; v12 (Q)
¢
v1
1Z1
(q1; Z1)
+
U22
¡
v21
¡
q2; Z2
¢
; v22 (Q)
¢
v22Q (Q)
U21
¡
v21 (q
2; Z2) ; v22 (Q)
¢
v2
1Z2
(q2; Z2)
= c;
(6)
Z2 + p2q
2 = (X ¡ CQ) ¡ p1q1 ¡ Z1: (7)
This new problem can be interpreted as a two stage problem. At the …rst
stage, the household allocates total expenditure between private, exclusive and
public goods, and at the second stage, expenditures on private and exclusive
goods are allocated among household members. Conditions (4), (5) and (7) are
the same as conditions (1) to (3), respectively, in the problem (P1) without public
goods. Therefore, Chiappori’s results obtained from that problem apply to the
study of the allocation of the private and exclusive goods expenditures in the
second stage of problem (P2).
Under our assumptions, the demand functions q1; q2 from R3+ to R+ are twice
di¤erentiable. We use the following notation from Chiappori (1988):
Mk =
@M
@K ; where M = q
1; q2; Z1; Z2; etc., and K = p1; p2; x
A =
q1p2
q1x
; B =
q2p1
q2x
; and
® =
( h
1 ¡ BAx¡Ap1ABx¡Bp2
i¡1
if ABx ¡ Bp2 6= 0
0 otherwise,
¯ = 1 ¡ ®:
Chiappori (1988) arrives to the following result:
Proposition 1. Let the demand functions q1and q2satisfy the two following reg-
ularity conditions for each (p1; p2; x) :
q1x:q
2
x 6= 0 (R1)
ABx ¡ Bp2 6= BAx ¡ Bp2 : (R2)
For q1; q2 to be collectively rational for egoistic agents in the sense of De…-
nition 1, the following conditions are necessary:
®xA + ®Ax ¡ ®p2 = 0 (CREA a)
¯xB + ¯Bx ¡ ¯p1 = 0: (CREA b)
If these conditions are satis…ed, Z1and Z2 are unique up to an additive constant,
and Zi depends only on qi (p1; p2; x) and pi (i = 1; 2) :
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The conditions (CREA a, b) are empirical properties on …rst and second
demand derivatives. In view of Proposition 1, if these properties are not satis…ed,
then we know that household outcomes are not e¢cient.
We are also interested in recovering the unobserved intrahousehold alloca-
tion of private goods. We have interpreted that the private goods expenditures
in the second stage of problem (P2) are allocated between the two household
members. Then, conditional on that allocation, each one solves his/her own util-
ity maximization problem. From the Second Welfare Theorem, we know that if¡
q1¤; q2¤; Z1¤; Z2¤
¢
is an e¢cient allocation and x > 0 is the household expen-
diture on private and exclusive goods, there exists a price vector (p¤1; p¤2) in R2+,
such that
¡
q1¤; q2¤; Z1¤; Z2¤; p¤1; p
¤
2
¢
is the competitive equilibrium that solves the
pair of individual problems:(
Max
qi;Zi
vi
¡
qi; Zi
¢
s:t: piq
i + Zi = Ái¤ i = 1; 2;
where Ái¤ = p¤i qi¤ + Zi¤: Based on this Theorem we de…ne the existence of a
sharing rule function.
De…nition 2. Let q1 (p1; p2; x)and Z1 (p1; p2; x) be two demand functions that
solve the problem
Max
q1;Z1
v1
¡
q1; Z1
¢
s:t: p1q
1 + Z1 = Á (p1; p2; x) :
Then the function Á : R3+! ]0; X[ is the sharing rule, where
Á (p1; p2; x) = p1q
1 (p1; p2; x) + Z
1 (p1; p2; x) :
The conditions (CREA a, b) of Proposition 1 imply the existence of such a
sharing rule.
Proposition 2. (Chiappori, 1988 and 1992). Given two demand functions q1
and q2 satisfying conditions (CREA a, b) of Proposition 1, a sharing rule is
de…ned up to an additive constant; speci…cally, its partial derivatives are given
by
Áx = ®
Áp1 = ¡¯B
Áp2 = ®A
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The derivative of the sharing rule with respect to x; ®; is the share of marginal
expenditure received by member 1. ¯ = 1¡®; is the share of marginal expenditure
received by member 2. Ápi is the marginal change in expenditures when there
is a change in the price pi: We are interested in the sign of these derivatives for
speci…c demand functions (see below the example in section 4).
Because of the weak separability assumption, this model does not allow us
to analyze the e¤ect of public goods on the intrahousehold allocation of private
goods. In the following section we introduce another separability assumption
between public and exclusive goods in order to obtain an expression for the rela-
tionship between the amount of public goods and the sharing rule which guides
the allocation of the private good expenditures.
3. THE EXTENDED MODEL: PUBLIC GOOD EFFECT
In general, we expect that the price of a public good a¤ects the demand for
both private and exclusive goods. In this paper, however, we only allow for
the public good e¤ect on the private good demand but not on the exclusive
good demand. For this purpose, we make the following separability assumption
between household public goods and exclusive goods:
Assumption S. The public good price does not enter the exclusive good
demand and the exclusive good price does not enter the public good demand.
Mathematically:
qic = 0; Qpi = 0 i = 1; 2: (S)
The advantage of this assumption is that it is testable. For example, if we
estimate three demand functions for women’s clothing, men’s clothing and the
clean house, we can test if clothing prices a¤ect the clean house demand, and if
the clean house price a¤ects clothing demands. Intuitively, the wage rate may
very well a¤ect the demand for public goods. This is why we exclude leisure from
the list of exclusive goods in what follows.
In this framework, we de…ne a collectively rational behavior.
De…nition 3. Household demands for the exclusive goods (q1 (p1; p2;X) ; q2 (p1; p2;X))
and for the public good Q (c;X) are said to be collectively rational (CR*) if
there exist two demand functions Z1 and Z2 from R4+ to R+; and two utility
functions U1
¡
L1; Z1;Q
¢
and U2
¡
L2; Z2;Q
¢
such that, for all (p1; p2; c;X) in R4+
and ¹ 2 R+, the functions q1; q2; Z1; Z2;Q; solve the problem
Max
q1;q2;Z1;Z2;Q
U1
¡
q1; Z1;Q
¢
+ ¹U2
¡
q2; Z2;Q
¢
(P3)
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s:t: p1q
1 + p2q
2 + Z1+ Z2 + cQ · X:
The …rst order conditions are:
U1q1
¡
q1; Z1;Q
¢
= p1U
1
z1
¡
q1; Z1; Q
¢
; (8)
U2q2
¡
q2; Z2;Q
¢
= p2U
2
z2
¡
q2; Z2; Q
¢
; (9)
U1Q
¡
q1; Z1;Q
¢
U1z (q
1; Z1;Q)
+
U2Q
¡
q2; Z2; Q
¢
U2z (q
2; Z2;Q)
= c; (10)
p1q
1 + p2q
2 + Z1 + Z2 + cQ = X: (11)
In what follows, we keep Chiappori’s notation (A, B, ®; ¯), but introduce new
notations to include the public good demand:
Mk =
@M
@K ; M = q
1; q2; Q; Z1; Z2; etc. and K = p1; p2; C;X:
A =
q1p2
q1x
; B =
q2p1
q2x
; D =
Qc
Qx
; ± =
D + Q
D
;
® =
( h
1 ¡ BAx¡Ap1ABx¡Bp2
i¡1
if ABx ¡ Bp2 6= 0
0 otherwise,
° =
8<: AB(±x¡
±c
D )
Ap1¡BAx¡(Bp2¡ABx)
if Ap1 ¡ BAx 6= Bp2 ¡ ABx
0 otherwise,
¯ = 1 ¡ ®:
When a term is multiplied by ±; we denote it with 0; for example, ®0 = ®±; ®0x =
(®±)x = ®x± + ±x®.
The following result is based on conditions (8), (9) and (11).
Proposition 1. Let the demand functions q1; q2 and Q satisfy the two following
regularity conditions. For each (p1; p2; c;X) in R4+,
q1x 6= 0; q2x 6= 0 and Qc 6= 0; (R*1)
ABx ¡ Bp2 6= BAx ¡ Bp2 : (R*2)
For q1; q2;Q to be collectively rational in the sense of De…nition 3, the following
conditions are necessary:³
®
0
+ °
´
Ax + A
³
®
0
x + °x
´
=
A
D
³
®
0
c + °c
´
+
³
®
0
p2 + °p2
´
; (CR* a)
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³
¯
0 ¡ °
´
Bx + B
³
¯
0
x ¡ °x
´
=
B
D
³
¯
0
c ¡ °c
´
+
³
¯
0
p1 ¡ °p1
´
: ( CR* b)
If these conditions are satis…ed, then we can recover the functions Z1pi and
Z2pi, and Z
i only depends on qi (p1; p2;X) ; Q (c;X) and pi (i = 1; 2) :
See the proof in Appendix 1.
Corollary 2. The conditions (CREA a) and (CREA b) from the model without
public goods are nested in conditions (CR* a) and (CR* b) for the case Q = 0.
P roof. If Q = 0; then ± =
³
D+Q
D
´
= Qc+QQxQc = 1: This implies that
° = 0; ®0 = ®± = ®; ¯0 = ¯± = ¯; and ®c = 0: Therefore, replacing these in the
expression (CR* a):n³
®
0
+ °
´
Ax + A
³
®
0
x + °x
´
¡ AD
³
®
0
c + °c
´
¡
³
®
0
p2 + °p2
´
= 0
o
; becomes ex-
pression (CREA a): f®Ax + A®x ¡ ®p2 = 0g : Analogously, expression (CR* b)
becomes (CREA b) when Q = 0:
The conditions (CR* a) and (CR* b) are empirical properties of the demand
functions formulated in terms of their …rst and second derivatives with respect
to prices and household expenditures. Thus, for a particular system of demand
functions, these conditions will appear as parameter restrictions.
We are interested in the e¤ect of public goods on the sharing rule which gives
us the individual expenditure on private goods.
De…nition 4. Let qi (p1; p2;X) ; Zi (p1; p2; c;X) and Q (c;X), for i = 1; 2; be the
demand functions that solve the problem
Max
q1;q2;Z1;Z2;Q
U1
¡
q1; Z1;Q
¢
+ ¹U2
¡
q2; Z2;Q
¢
s:t: p1q
1 + p2q
2 + Z1+ Z2 + CQ · X:
Then the function © : R4+! ]0;X [ is the sharing rule for private goods, where
©(p1; p2; c;X) = p1q
1 (p1; p2;X) + Z
1 (p1; p2; c;X) :
As before, the e¢ciency conditions of Proposition 3 are su¢cient for the ex-
istence of the sharing rule for private goods.
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Proposition 3. Given the demand functions q1; q2 and Q, satisfying conditions
(CR* a) and (CR* b) of Proposition 3, the derivatives of the sharing rule for
private goods with respect to prices are given by
©p1 = B (¡¯± + °) = Áp1± + B°;
©p2 = A (®± + °) = Áp2± + A°;
where Á is the sharing rule in the model without public goods.
The proof is in Appendix 2.
Corollary 4. In the case of zero consumption of public goods, the derivatives of
the sharing rule with respect to prices in the model without public goods, Ápi ;
coincides with the derivatives of the sharing rule for private goods in the model
with public goods, ©pi .
P roof. If Q = 0; ± = 1 and ° = 0, then
©p1 = Áp1± + B° = Áp1 ;
©p2 = Áp2± + A° = Áp2 :
Remark 1. We observe two components in the derivatives of the sharing rule
with respect to prices. If public goods are normal goods, then the …rst component,
Ápi±; is smaller in absolute value than Ápi because ± 2 [0; 1] :
We have ± = Qc+QQxQc : In the optimal allocation, the numerator is the Slutsky
equation, i.e., the substitution e¤ect calculated from the Hicksian demand for
public good. The denominator is the total e¤ect calculated from the Marshallian
demand. If public goods are normal goods, then the substitution e¤ect has an
absolute value smaller than the total e¤ect, and we therefore have ± 2 [0; 1] and¯¯
Ápi±
¯¯ · ¯¯Ápi ¯¯ :
4. AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
We take the functional form of Chiappori’s example (1988 and 1992) for exclusive
goods demand, we add a public good demand, and we assume that such demands
satisfy assumption (S) :
q1 (X;p1; p2) = a1 + b1X + c1X log X + d
1
1p1 + d
2
1p2; (4.1)
q2 (X;p1; p2) = a2 + b2X + c2X log X + d
1
2p1 + d
2
2p2; (4.2)
Q (X;C) = a3 + b3X + c3X log X + d3C: (4.3)
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We calculate the terms used in Proposition 3:
qipj = d
j
i ; Qc = d3; q
i
x = bi + ci + ci log X; q
i
xx = ci=X;
Qx = b3 + c3 + c3 logX; Qxx = c3=X;
A =
d21
q1x
; B =
d12
q2x
; D =
d3
Qx
;
® =
c2
c2b1 ¡ c1b2q
1
x; ¯ =
c1
c1b2¡ c2b1q
2
x;
± = 1 +
QQx
d3
; ° =
c3
d3 (c1b2 ¡ c2b1)q
1
xq
2
xQ;
®x =
c2
c2b1 ¡ c1b2 q
1
xx = ®
q1xx
q1x
; ®p2 = ®c = 0;
°x = °
µ
q1xx
q1x
+
q2xx
q2x
+
Qx
Q
¶
; °c = °
Qc
Q
; °pi = 0;
±x =
QxQx
Qc
+
QQxx
Qc
; ±c = Qx:
4.1. The Initial Model without Public Goods
In this example, the regularity conditions (R1) q1xq
2
x 6= 0 and (R2) (ABx ¡ Bp2 6= BAx ¡ Bp2)
are satis…ed for all x when c1b2 6= c2b1:
The demand functions are linear in prices, so that ®p2 = ¯p1 = 0: The neces-
sary conditions imposed by colllective rationality for egoistic agents are:
®xA + ®Ax = 0; (CRAE a)
¯xB + ¯Bx = 0: (CRAE b)
Since ®xA+®Ax = @@X®A =
@
@X
³
c2
c2b1¡c1b2 q
1
x
d21
q1x
´
= 0; these conditions are always
satis…ed for all values of the parameters ai; bi; ci; dii; d
j
i ; i; j = 1; 2: Consequently,
we cannot test e¢ciency for this functional form. We can, however, recover the
derivatives of the sharing rule:
Áx = ® =
c2 (b1 + c1 + c1 logX)
H
Áp1 = ¡¯B =
c1d12
H
Áp2 = ®A =
c2d
2
1
H
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where H = c2b1 ¡ c1b2:
We want to know the sign of these derivatives in order to predict whether a
change in private and exclusive goods expenditures, x; or a change in exclusive
goods prices, will produce either an increase or a decrease in individual expen-
ditures. If we assume that all goods are normal, then qix > 0; Qx > 0 for all
X; (bi > 0 and ci > 0) and qipi < 0; Qc < 0 (d
i
i < 0; d3 < 0): The cross-price
e¤ect, qipj , is negative if the good q
i is a gross complement of good qj
³
dji < 0
´
and it is positive if qi is a gross substitute for qj
³
dji > 0
´
: The denominator, H;
can be positive or negative.If H > 0 then, sign
¡
Áp1
¢
= sign
¡
d12
¢
. Thus, if p1
increases and q2 is a gross substitute for q1; we then predict an increase in the
share of expenditure received by member 1. In Chiappori’s example, q1 and q2
are leisure demands, p1 and p2 are the wages, and the sharing rule is de…ned for
non-labor income. In this case, we observe an increase in the man’s wage and
leisure is a normal good, and the man’s labor supply will therefore increase. If
the woman’s leisure is a gross substitute (gross complement) of the man’s leisure,
Áp1 > 0
¡
Áp1 < 0
¢
, then we predict an increase (decrease) of the man’s share of
non-labor income.
4.2. The Extended Model with Public Goods
The regularity conditions (R*1) and (R*2) are satis…ed if d3 6= 0 and c1b2 6= c2b1:
Since, for this example, ®0p2 = °p2 = ¯p1 = °p1 = 0; the conditions (CR*a) and
(CR*b) of Proposition 3 are:¡
®0 + °
¢
Ax + A
¡
®0x + °x
¢
=
A
D
¡
®0c + °c
¢
; (CR* a)³
¯
0 ¡ °
´
Bx + B
³
¯
0
x ¡ °x
´
=
B
D
³
¯
0
c ¡ °c
´
: (CR* b)
By replacing the equality terms in (CR¤a) and simplifying, we have:
(®± + °)Ax+A ((®±)x + °x) = A
µ
®
µ
QxQx
Qc
+
QQxx
Qc
¶
+ °
q2xx
q2x
+ °
Qx
Q
¶
; (4.4)
A
D
((®±)c + °c) = A
Qx
Qc
µ
®Qx + °
Qc
Q
¶
: (4.5)
So, the expression (CR¤a) that results equating the right hand sides of (4:4) and
(4:5) is:
®QQxx
Qc
+ °
q2xx
q2x
= 0: (4.6)
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And on replacing (4.6) from the demand functions, we obtain:
c2
c2b1 ¡ c1b2
c3
Xd3
q1xQ ¡
c3
d3 (c2b1 ¡ c1b2)
c2
X
q1xQ = 0: (4.7)
Since condition (4.7) is always satis…ed by these demand functions, we can not
test e¢ciency in this example.
We calculate the derivatives of the sharing rule for private goods and obtain:
©p1 = Áp1± + B° =
c1d
1
2
H
µ
d3 + QQx
d3
¶
¡ c3d
1
2
Hd3
Qq1x; (4.8)
©p2 = Áp2± + A° =
c2d
2
1
H
µ
d3 + QQx
d3
¶
¡ c3d
2
1
Hd3
Qq2x: (4.9)
Since
¯¯
Ápi±
¯¯ · ¯¯Ápi ¯¯ (see Remark 1), the …rst e¤ect of public good consumption
is the reduction of the amount of the sharing rule change with respect to price
variation. The second component is
³
¡c3d12Hd3Qq1x
´
; whose sign depends on those
of H and d12 . If H > 0; sign
³
¡ c3d12Hd3Qq1x
´
= sign
¡
d12
¢
:
When we consider the two components, we conclude that, if H > 0; sign (©p1) =
sign
¡
d12
¢
and the e¤ect in the sharing rule produced by a change in p1 has the
same sign as in the model without public goods: the sign is positive if q2 is a
gross substitute of q1 and it is negative if q2 is a gross complement of q1.
Summing up, the sign of a sharing rule change caused by a price variation
does not depend on public goods consumption, but the presence of the public
good does, in fact, modify the amount of this sharing rule change.
13
5. CONCLUSIONS
The main restriction of the model is our separability assumption which does not
allow any e¤ect of the exclusive good’s prices on the demand for the public good.
Since the public good demand depends on wages, our model cannot be used for
the study of the empirical properties of labor supply, considered as an exclusive
good. In contrast to the weak separability, however, our separability assumption
allows the prices of public goods to enter the private good demand. Hence, our
collective model allows the study of the e¤ect of public goods on the allocation
of private expenditures.
With regard to the contributions of this paper, we have derived new testable
restrictions on observable behavior (the demand for public and exclusive goods).
These restrictions are necesary conditions for Pareto e¢ciency. We show that the
parametric restrictions derived by Chiappori (1988) for the case without public
goods are nested in our conditions for the case with public goods. On the other
hand, the collective setting developed here allows us to learn about the allocation
of household expenditures in private goods between the two agents: the man
and the woman. In particular, we can predict how the sharing of household
expenditures between the man an the woman changes when the exclusive goods’
prices change. This change depends on the amount of the public good. In the
context of our model, we can then study the e¤ect of any tax policy that changes
the exclusive goods’ prices on the distribution of household expenditures in private
goods between the husband and the wife, and we can measure how the extent of
this e¤ect depends on the amount of public goods that exists in the home.
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6. APPENDIX 1
Let us consider Chiappori’s Lemma, generalized for m + 1 functions.
Lemma 1. Let ½;X1;X2; :::;Xm be any m + 1 C1 functions from some open,
non-empty subset B of Rn to R, with n ¸ m and such that gradX1; gradX2; ::; gradXm
are noncolinear. For a function µ from Rm to R; such that
for all (x1; ::; xn) 2 B;
½(x1; ::; xn) = µ
£
X1(x1; ::; xn);X
2(x1; ::; xn); ::;X
m(x1; ::; xn)
¤
to exist in a neighborhood of any point of B; it is necessary and su¢cient that
the vectors grad½; gradX1; gradX2; :::; gradXm are always colinear.
Applying the above lemma to the …rst order conditions of the e¢ciency prob-
lem, we obtain the conditions for collective rationality and the expressions for
the derivatives of the sharing rule. The …rst order conditions for the e¢ciency
problem are:
(1) U1q1
¡
q1; Z1; Q
¢
= p1U
1
z1
¡
q1; Z1;Q
¢
;
(2) U2
q2
¡
q2; Z2; Q
¢
= p2U
2
z2
¡
q2; Z2;Q
¢
;
(3)
U1Q(q
1;Z1;Q)
U1z (q
1;Z1;Q)
+
U2Q(q
2;Z2;Q)
U2z (q
2;Z2;Q)
= c;
(4) p1q
1 + p2q
2 + Z1+ Z2 + CQ = X:
Consider any three functions q1; q2; Q: For these functions to be CR¤ demand
functions, it is necessary that there exist two functions Z1 and Z2 such that the
…rst order conditions are satis…ed.
Let (p1; p2; C;X) be a point in R4 such that q1; q2 and Q are not corner
solutions and such that q1x 6= 0; q2x 6= 0 and Qc 6= 0: Relation (1) can be written
(and symmetrically relation (2)):¡
U1qq ¡ p1U1Zq
¢
gradq1+
¡
U1qz ¡ p1U1ZZ
¢
gradZ1++
¡
U1qQ¡ U1zQ
¢
grad Q¡U1z grad p1 = 0
Therefore, gradZi; grad qi; gradQ; grad p1; are colinear. The lemma applies
directly here, with n = 4 and X1 (:) = q1 (p1; p2; c;X) ; X2 (:) = Q (p1; p2; C;X) ;
X3 (:) = p1; ½ (:) = Z
1 (p1; p2; C;X) ; since q1x 6= 0; q2x 6= 0 and Qc 6= 0: Thus,
locally, Zi = µ
¡
qi;Q; pi
¢
for i = 1; 2:
The application of the lemma requires that rank
h
grad q1; gradQ; gradp1
i
=
3 . The separability assumption implies: qic = 0; Qpi = 0; for i = 1; 2, so that the
above matrix expression gives:
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rank
2664
q1p1 0 1
q1p2 0 0
0 Qc 0
q1x Qx 0
3775 = 3;()
¯¯¯¯
¯¯ q
1
p1 0 1
q1p2 0 0
q1x Qx 0
¯¯¯¯
¯¯ 6= 0 ; or
¯¯¯¯
¯¯ q
1
p1 0 1
q1p2 0 0
0 Qc 0
¯¯¯¯
¯¯ 6= 0; or
¯¯¯¯
¯¯ q
1
p1 0 1
0 Qc 0
q1x Qx 0
¯¯¯¯
¯¯ 6= 0 :
Therefore, if we assume
q1x 6= 0; q2x 6= 0; Qc 6= 0; (R1)
the above rank condition holds. We call these conditions regularity conditions
because these are ful…lled in most cases.
From the budget constraint (4), one obtains that
Z2 + p2q
2 = (X ¡ CQ) + (¡p1q1 ¡ Z1): (A2)
De…ne '(q1;Q; p1) = ¡Z1(q1; Q; p1)¡p1q1: Note that '(q1;Q; p1) = ¡©(p1; p2; c;X) :
Our objetive is to …nd the derivatives of the sharing rule for private goods (©),
so we will develop the gradient expression for ':
Since the left hand side of (A2) only depends on Z2; q2 and p2; the right
hand side, (X ¡ CQ) + '(q1;Q; p1), depends on these same variables, and its
gradient is colinear with the gradients of q2; Q and p2: Applying the lemma to
this expression, one gets:
¯¯¯
grad (X ¡ CQ) + ' (q1;Q; p1) grad q2 gradQ grad p2
¯¯¯
= 0: Note that grad p2 =
2664
0
1
0
0
3775 :
The above determinant is equal to:¯¯¯¯
¯¯ 'q1q
1
p1 + 'p1 q
2
p1 0¡Q + Qc('Q ¡ C) 0 Qc
1 + 'q1q
1
x + Qx('Q ¡ C) q2x Qx
¯¯¯¯
¯¯ = 0:
Let B =
q2p1
q2x
, and D = QcQx ; then, from this determinant we obtain:
BD
³
1 + 'q1q
1
x + Qx('Q ¡ C)
´
¡B
³
¡Q + Qc('Q ¡ C)
´
¡D ¡'q1q1p1 + 'p1¢ = 0:
Dividing by D; we eliminate the term BQx('Q ¡ C) and get:
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'p1 = B
µ
D + Q
D
¶
¡ 'q1
¡
q1p1 ¡ Bq1x
¢
;
and calling ± =
³
D+Q
D
´
; the above expression gives:
'p1=B±-'q1
¡
q1p1 ¡ Bq1x
¢
(A3)
Since the term 'q1 is not observable, we continue developing the above expression.
The right hand side B±-'q1
¡
q1p1 ¡ Bq1x
¢
in (A3) depends only on q1; Q and p1; that
enter ': Again, we can apply the lemma because of colinearity among gradients
of this expression and of q1; Q and p1: Taking into account that the separability
assumption makes ±pi = 0; Bc = 0 and qipic = q
i
xc = 0; the determinant for the
gradients is equal to:¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯ Bp2± ¡ 'qqq1p2(q1p1 ¡ Bq1x) ¡ 'q(q1p1p2 ¡ Bp2q1x ¡ Bq1p2x) q1p2 0B±c ¡ 'qQQc(q1p1 ¡ Bq1x) 0 Qc
±Bx + B±x ¡ ('qqq1x + 'qQQx)(q1p1 ¡ Bq1x) ¡ 'q(q1p1x ¡ Bxq1x ¡ Bq1xx) q1x Qx
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯ = 0
If A =
q1p2
q1x
; then the above determinant gives:
0 = AD
³
±Bx + B±x ¡ ('qqq1x + 'qQQx)(q1p1 ¡ Bq1x) ¡ 'q(q1p1x ¡ Bxq
1
x ¡ Bq1xx)
´
¡
¡A ¡B±c ¡ 'qQQc(q1p1 ¡ Bq1x)¢ ¡ D ³Bp2± ¡ 'qqq1p2(q1p1 ¡ Bq1x) ¡ 'q(q1p1p2 ¡ Bp2q1x ¡ Bq1p2x)´
Dividing by D; and since Aq1x = q
1
p2 ; the terms multiplying 'qq are eliminated.
Since QcD = Qx; the term in 'qQ is also eliminated . Consider also that q
1
p2x ¡
Aq1xx = Axq
1
x and q
1
p1p2 ¡ Aq1p1x = Ap1q1x: Carrying together in the left side the
terms multiplied by 'q1 gives:
'q1q
1
x [Ap1 ¡ BAx ¡ (Bp2 ¡ ABx)] = ±Bp2 ¡ A (±Bx + B±x) +
A
D
B±c:
We denote B
0
= B±; and the above expression gives:
'q1q1x [Ap1 ¡ BAx ¡ (Bp2 ¡ ABx)]=B0p2-AB
0
x+
A
DB
0
c (A4)
In (A4) the only unobservable term is 'q1 ; so we can obtain 'q1 in terms of the
demand parameters of public and exclusive goods. And replacing this expression
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in (A3), we also obtain an observable expression for 'p1 : In order to calculate
'q1; we assume that the following regularity condition is satis…ed:
(Ap1 ¡ BAx) 6= (Bp2 ¡ ABx) 6= 0: (R2)
We can calculate 'q1 from (A4) and get:
'q1 =
¡®0
q1x
+
¡°
q1x
; (1)
where
®
0
=
±
1 ¡ Ap1¡BAxBp2¡ABx
; ° =
AB
¡
±x ¡ ±cD
¢
Ap1 ¡ BAx ¡ (Bp2 ¡ ABx)
:
Replacing 'q1 in (A3), the expression for 'p1 is:
'p1 = B
0
+
³
®
0
+ °
´ Ãq1p1
q1x
¡ B
!
: (2)
Summing up, we have obtained expressions (1) and (2) for 'q1 and 'p1 . We
can obtain the empirical restrictions implied by collective rationality (CR*1) and
(CR*2) from these expressions.
Firstly, since 'q1 depends on q
1; Q and p1; again from the lemma:¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯ (®0 + °) q
1
p2x
(q1x)
2 ¡ 1q1x (®
0
p2 + °p2) A 0
¡ 1
q1x
(®c + °c) 0 D
(®
0
+ °) q
1
xx
(q1x)
2 ¡ 1q1x (®
0
x + °x) 1 1
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯ = 0;
and this determinant gives:
A
µ
(®
0
+ °)
q1xx
(q1x)
2
¡ 1
q1x
(®
0
x + °x)
¶
+
A
D
µ
1
q1x
(®c + °c)
¶
¡
Ã
(®
0
+ °)
q1p2x
(q1x)
2
¡ 1
q1x
(®
0
p2 + °p2)
!
= 0
Since
q1p2x
q1x
¡ Aq1xxq1x = Ax; we obtain the …rst empirical restriction:³
®
0
+ °
´
Ax+A
³
®
0
x + °x
´
=AD
³
®
0
c + °c
´
+
³
®
0
p2 + °p2
´
(CR* 1)
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Secondly, for 'q1 and 'p1to be compatible and for the integrability of ', it is
necessary that 'q1p1 = 'p1q1 : To compute this, consider
' (p1; p2; C;X) = '
¡
q1 (p1; p2;X) ;Q (C;X) ; p1
¢ )
'p1q1 =
@
@q1
'p1 =
@
@p1
'p1
@p1
@q1
+
@
@p2
'p1
@p2
@q1
+
@
@C
'p1
@C
@q1
+
@
@X
'p1
@X
@q1
'q1p1 =
@
@p1
'q1 =
@
@p1
'q1
@p1
@p1
+
@
@p2
'q1
@p2
@p1
+
@
@C
'q1
@C
@p1
+
@
@X
'q1
@X
@p1
To calculate these derivatives we need the following Jacobian matrix @(p1;p2;C;X)
@(p1;p2;Q;q1)
.
If we de…ne the mapping ¦ : (p1; p2; C;X) ! (p1; p2;Q; q1); the Jacobian matrix
of ¦ is:
J(¦) =
@
¡
p1; p2;Q; q
1
¢
@ (p1; p2; C;X)
=
2664
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 Qc Qx
q1p1 q
1
p2 0 q
1
x
3775 jJ(¦)j = q1xQc:
And the Jacobian matrix of ¦¡1 is:
(J(¦))¡1 =
266664
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
q1p1
q1x
1
D
q1p2
q1x
1
D
1
Qc
¡ 1q1x
1
D
¡q
1
p1
q1x
¡ q1p2
q1x
0 1
q1x
377775 = 1J(¦¡1) ´ @ (p1; p2; C; X)@ (p1; p2;Q; q1) :
Then, the expression for second derivatives of ' are:
'p1q1 =
@
@q1
'p1 =
@
@q1
Ã³
®
0
x + °x
´Ãq1p1
q1x
¡ B
!!
= ¡ 1
q1x
1
D
@
@C
"
B
0
+
³
®
0
+ °
´Ãq1p1
q1x
¡ B
!#
+
+
1
q1x
@
@X
"
B
0
+
³
®
0
+ °
´Ãq1p1
q1x
¡ B
!#
;
'q1p1 =
@
@p1
'q1 =
@
@p1
Ã
¡®0
q1x
+
¡°
q1x
!
+
q1p1
q1x
1
D
@
@C
Ã
¡®0
q1x
+
¡°
q1x
!
¡ q
1
p1
q1x
@
@X
Ã
¡®0
q1x
+
¡°
q1x
!
:
1By the Theorem of the Inverse Function
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Equating the two above expressions we obtain:
B
0
x ¡ (®
0
x + °x)B ¡ (®
0
+ °)Bx = ¡(®0p1 + °p1) +
B
0
c
D
¡ B
D
³
®
0
c + °c
´
;
and since ®
0
= ®±; and ¯
0
= (1 ¡ ®) ± = ¯± ) ¯0x = ±¯x+¯±x; ¯
0
c = ¯±c; ¯
0
p1 =
±¯p1 ; we express the above equality as the second empirical restriction:³
¯
0 ¡ °
´
Bx+B
³
¯
0
x ¡ °x
´
=
³
¯
0
p1 ¡ °p1
´
+BD
³
¯
0
c ¡ °c
´
: (CR* 2)
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7. APPENDIX 2
Once the compatibility condition 'q1p1 = 'p1q1 is ful…lled, we can integrate and
obtain '; and since we have de…ned © as the sharing rule, then
'(q1;Q; p1) = ¡Z1(q1;Q; p1) ¡ p1q1;
© = p1q
1 + Z1 = ¡'(q1;Q; p1):
In Appendix 1 we obtained the following expressions:
'q1 =
¡®0
q1x
+
¡°
q1x
'p1 = B
0
+
³
®
0
+ °
´Ãq1p1
q1x
¡ B
!
:
Thus, the relationship between © and ' gives us the derivatives of the sharing
rule with respect to prices:
©p1 = ¡
¡
'q1q
1
p1 + 'p1
¢
= B (¡¯± + °) ;
©p2 = ¡'q1q1p2 = A (®± + °) :
But we can not recover ©c and ©x
©c = ¡'QQc;
©x = ¡'q1q1x ¡ 'QQx;
since we do not know 'Q:
23
